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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Plaintiffs and the court of appeals advocate a new legal landscape where parties will be 
required to openly second guess the trial court's legal rulings in order to preserve an issue 
for appeal and then present irrelevant legal issues at trial, even though the jury cannot and 
should not be involved in resolving the legal issues. In contrast, Hanson advocates for 
this Court to reaffirm its prior rulings, which provide the following: 
• A party must raise an issue once in order to preserve it for appeal; 
• Whether a duty of care is owed is a legal question for the trial court 
to resolve; 
• An appellate court has jurisdiction to review a trial court's pre-trial 
rulings on questions of law to ensure that the ruling is correct. 
In advocating for a change to Utah law, much of plaintiffs' argument is contrary to 
record in this case. Plaintiffs' brief devotes 43 pages in an attempt to justify why the 
court of appeals was correct in its decision to decline to reach the merits of Hanson's pre-
trial motion. Notwithstanding plaintiffs arguments, the issues on which this Court 
granted certiorari are straightforward and well defined under existing Utah law. Hanson 
requests this Court to reaffirm its prior opinions, reverse the court of appeals, and remand 
this case to the court of appeals to consider the merits of whether the trial court erred in 
its legal conclusion that Hanson owed the decedent a duty of care. 
1 
ARGUMENT 
I. Appellate review of pre-trial rulings is a meaningful and fundamental right to 
parties. 
Summary judgment is an important procedural tool; however, under the court of 
appeals' opinion, a defendant will lose the opportunity for meaningful appellate review of 
a trial court's ruling on summary judgment. Plaintiffs' and the court of appeals argue that 
Hanson was afforded a full and fair opportunity to put on its case at trial and that any 
appeal should have been from the trial. See Hanson v. Normandeau, 2007 UT App 382 at 
TJ14, Plaintiffs' Brief at p. 33-36. In this case, however, Hanson's appeal was largely 
premised on the trial court's pre-trial errors in ruling on Hanson's motion for summary 
judgment and related motions. The central theme of Hanson's appeal was that this case 
should not have reached trial. In short Hanson's appeal asked the court of appeals to 
review the trial court's decision to allow the case to survive summary judgment 
The purpose of summary judgment is to allow a party to test the adequacy of a 
plaintiffs claim at certain predetermined times during the course of the litigation. In this 
case, the scheduling order provided that both fact discovery and expert designations had 
concluded. At this point, Hanson moved for summary judgment. Hanson's motion 
argued that plaintiffs' claims were legally deficient based on the state of the record as it 
existed at the time. Among other points, Hanson argued it owed the decedent no duty of 
care based on all of the evidence adduced by the close of fact discovery and based on 
plaintiffs' own expert testimony. 
Plaintiffs' and the court of appeals' analysis appears to premised on the notion that 
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review of a motion for summary judgment is somehow inferior to review of a trial on the 
merits because the evidence is more complete at trial than in a summary judgment motion. 
This argument may have some merit if the summary judgment motion was presented 
prior to the close of fact and expert discovery or if the trial court reserved its ruling in 
order to resolve disputed facts at trial. In this case, however, plaintiffs had access to all of 
the evidence presented at trial when Hanson submitted its motion for summary judgment 
and the trial court did not find any disputed issues of fact. Accordingly, plaintiffs cannot 
argue that appellate review of a motion for summary judgment deprived them of an 
opportunity to put on their case. 
In addition, plaintiffs' argument also suggests that because they prevailed at trial 
then it goes without saying that denial of summary judgment was appropriate. In other 
words, plaintiffs are bootstrapping the denial of summary judgment by the jury's award. 
In this case, however, the issue of duty was not presented to the jury. As Hanson has 
repeatedly argued, the jury does not decide the issue of duty, and therefore, it was not 
presented at trial. In fact, the record discloses that the parties and the trial court all 
recognized that no disputed issues of fact precluded a ruling on the issue of duty. Hanson 
presented its motion to the trial court, and the trial court ruled on the motion. 
Now, the court of appeals has denied Hanson the right to have appellate review of 
the trial court's pre-trial ruling. The court of appeals' analysis, however, is flawed in 
several respects. First, the court of appeals decided the issue of whether the trial court 
erred in allowing plaintiffs' to designate a previously undisclosed towing expert in 
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opposition to Hanson's motion. See Hanson, 2007 UT App 382 at ^fl[23-29. Hanson also 
appealed whether the trial court erred in allowing plaintiffs to untimely designate an 
undisclosed towing expert in order to oppose Hanson's motion for summary judgment. 
See Hanson v. Normandeau, 2007 UT App 382 at TJU23-29. Before the court of appeals, 
Hanson's appeal of this point was premised on an earlier opinion in Brown v. Jorgensen, 
2006 UT App 168, U1J19-22, 136 P.3d 1252, wherein the court of appeals reviewed the 
denial of partial summary judgment motion after trial on merits where part of the 
argument was to strike improper affidavit used to oppose motion. The court of appeals 
concluded that trial court did not error in allowing plaintiffs to use a previously 
undisclosed expert. 
What happens, however, if the court of appeals decides that the trial court erred in 
its decision to allow plaintiffs' to designate the expert? Under this scenario, the expert 
designation and the testimony used to oppose Hanson's motion for summary judgment 
would have been error; however, the court of appeals would not be able to reach the issue 
of whether Hanson was entitled to summary judgment after the improper expert testimony 
was excluded. In this scenario, the court of appeals could conclude that the trial court 
committed a prejudicial error, but it would be powerless to correct the error because 
under its analysis it would lack jurisdiction to review the denial of the summary judgment 
motion. 
Next, Hanson relied on established precedent that unequivocally allowed for 
appellate review and reversal of cases after a jury had decided in plaintiffs' favor because 
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the trial court erred in denying a defendant's motion for summary judgment. See, e.g., 
Prince, Yeates and Geldzahler v. Young, 2004 UT 26, 94 P.3d 179; Estate Landscape and 
Snow Removal Specialists, Inc. v. Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co., 844 
I .d 22.. (I huh I i ' i IIII .idiliiinii in IIIICM" ias< s. Hanson idled nil I llali law ill mi 
provides that duty is an issue of law for the trial court to decide. See Webb v. University 
of Utah, 2005 I JT 80, 125 P.3d 906, Finally, I lanson relied on the record ii I this case 
vvl lere all pai ties ai id the trial c :)i it t agi eed that no issi les • :>f fact pi ech ide J a i i ilii ig c in 
whether Hanson owed a duty of care as a matter of law and where the trial court ruled on 
the issue of duty as a matter of law without finding any issues of fact or reserving its 
i II ilii ig oi i the it ;: a u (I < it 626 3 1 , 822 861 62 1182 86, 20' ; "8 18) BJ ts< a 1 oi I tt ic • ;:c n in ! 2; 
ruling and established Utah law requiring the trial conn done to rule on the issue of duty, 
Hanson did not present the issue oi WIIUIK* *\ r ^ u . i vi».»\ oi care at in i-. Because the 
issi te was a legal iss ' • •• :. -M •> \ ., 
Howard, 2006 111 5<>. 144 P.3d 1147 is misplaced. Furthermore, since the issue of duty 
was not presented, at ti ial, I lai ISOI i's i i lotioi I for a directed X C M K . .a die v .O.MJ of plaintiffs' 
case did not address whether it owed a duty of care. Rathei. die molion addressed t(»<' 
evidence presented at trial and the law relating to that evidence. 
, . .. •.. - anson was not ei ititled to i ely on 
established Utah law and the record in this case. The court of appeals has decided that a 
party can no longer seek appellate review of pre-trial legal rulings after a trial oi I the 
n lerits. I lie coi iirt of appeals ' • decisioi i ii: i tl lis case dei lies I lai isoi I of its i igl it to have 
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meaningful appellate review of its defenses to plaintiffs' claims. This Court should 
reinforce the value of summary judgment to the process of litigating a case and 
meaningful appellate review of summary judgment. 
II. Appellate courts need the ability to rule on whether a case should have went 
to trial. 
Under both plaintiffs' and the court of appeals' reasoning, Utah's appellate courts 
will never have the ability to review a trial court's determination about whether a claim 
should have gone to the jury. This Court's prior decisions in Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler 
v. Young and in Estate Landscape and Snow Removal Specialists, Inc. v. Mountain States 
Telephone and Telegraph Co. would not be possible if the court of appeals decision in 
this case was correct. The mere fact that a trial court allowed a claim to go to the jury and 
that a jury found in plaintiffs' favor does not mean that the trial court ruled correctly. 
Both Prince, Yeates and Estate Landscape demonstrate that trial courts sometimes get it 
wrong. Parties need appellate review of a trial court's pre-trial rulings on the legal issues 
that determine whether or not a claim should be submitted to the jury. 
In both Prince, Yeates and Estate Landscape, this Court reversed final judgments 
awarded to a party because the claim should not have gone to trial. For example, in 
Estate Landscape, the trial court denied defendant's motion for summary judgment on the 
issue of an accord and satisfaction defense. See Estate Landscape and Snow Removal 
Specialists, Inc. v. Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co., 844 P.2d 322, 325 
(Utah 1992). The case went to trial, and plaintiff prevailed on its claims. On appeal, this 
Court reversed the trial court's pre-trial denial of defendant's accord and satisfaction 
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defensv. /v
 t .- -0. 
bmiliari), in Prince, Yeates, the law firm moved for partial summary judgment, 
arguing that its associate owed the law firm a diity of care. See Prince, Yeates & 
(r>'f(/ra;r mi . •• 
motion, finding no duty was owed, and the case proceeded to trial. At trial, a jury found 
ii i favor of the associate and awarded the associate $280,000. On appeal, the law firm 
1 Im Court reversed the trial o>ur! on ihr I.NSUC nl duty of care and vacated the jury's 
award to tlle associate. 
Unlike this Court's appellate review in Prince, Yeates and Estate / m<ki <; •t u 
court of appeals, whiK piling duty was a legal issue, declined to review the trial ion*! -
5
 ;i .: . !.;.• . i L ^ U I : ^ ii ilCKn 111 led tl 1C i s s u e s relating lo wi^Hici a Jul'* 
was owed were intertwined with the factual issues that went to trial. See Hanson v. 
Normandeau, 2007 IIT App 382 at f 14. In />//?ce, Feates and Estate Landscape, 
linw eu i „ lln; I\MH/\ mi Minimal findi'iiK in and .ml 111• 11 \\i it inn Ii ss inlntw im/d. 
Nonetheless, this Court still reviewed the trial court's pre-trial rulings. Accordingly, the 
coiirt of appeals' decision in this case appears to he a departure from this caourt's view of 
i ;i^ ' 1 lat cai i be rei > ie wed oi i app sal 
Furthermore, even if tlie court of appeals' conclusion that the issues were 
intertwii led was correct, whether a duty of care is owed remains a threshold legal issue 
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intertwined with trial issues. The trial court had an obligation to resolve the threshold 
legal issue before trial, and the court of appeals had jurisdiction to review the issue on 
appeal in order to determine if the trial court's legal ruling was correct. 
The court of appeals' ruling in this case, however, changes the landscape in Utah. 
Under the court of appeals' opinion, the parties in Estate Landscape and Prince, Yeates 
would no longer be able to appeal the denial of the pre-trial motions for summary 
judgment. In short, the parties could not seek appellate review of whether the trial court 
correctly determined threshold legal rulings. Because the court of appeals' decision 
conflicts with Utah law and precludes meaningful appellate review of a trial court's pre-
trial rulings, this Court should reverse and remand to the court of appeals to review the 
merits of whether Hanson owed a legal duty of care. 
III. Plaintiffs, rather than Hanson, have focused on the issue of foreseeability, and 
Plaintiffs have argued that duty is a fact issue only on appeal. 
Throughout this case, Hanson has consistently argued that duty is legal issue that 
the trial court could rule on as a matter of law and that the court of appeals could review 
for correctness. Hanson's position is consistent with Utah law, which unequivocally 
states that duty is a legal issue that the trial court must decide. See Webb v. University of 
Utah, 2005 UT 80,1f9, 125 P.3d 906. Before the court of appeals, Hanson appealed the 
trial court's denial of its motion for summary judgment, arguing that the trial court erred 
as a matter of law in concluding that Hanson owed a duty of care. 
Although conceding that duty is a legal issue, plaintiffs go to great length to 
demonstrate why in this particular case it was a factual issue for trial. Thus, although 
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Utah law provides that duty of care is a pre-trial legal issue for the trial court it became a 
factual issue for trial in this case. In addition to being entirely inconsistent with Utah law, 
the record in this case belies plaintiffs' argument on appeal 
Plaintiffs start their argument by saying that it was Hanson who interjected the 
issue of foreseeability into the mix and transformed the legal issue into a factual issue. In 
fact, Hanson's motion for summary judgment focused on the relationship of the parties. 
(R. at 626-31). Hanson's motion discussed the nature of the relationship between a repair 
shop and a subsequent tow truck driver. In its discussion, Hanson did note that the trial 
court should look at foreseeability among the many factors used to determine whether a 
duty of care is owed. (R. at 628). Consistent with the factors used to determine when a 
legal duty of care is owed, Hanson argued it owed no duty because of the remoteness of 
the parties' relationship and because it was unforeseeable that a tow truck driver would be 
injured because he negligently performed his job. (R. at 630-31) 
In their memorandum, plaintiffs advanced alternative arguments in opposition to 
Hanson's motion on whether a duty of care was owed. Plaintiffs argued either a legal 
duty of care was owed based on the undisputed facts of the case, or in the alternative, 
there were factual issues for trial. (R. at 822, 861-62). Although plaintiffs asserted the 
alternative argument, plaintiffs' opposition memorandum argued that the trial court could 
determine that Hanson owed a legal duty as a matter of law. (R. at 861-62). Plaintiffs 
argued the issue turned on foreseeability rather than the relationship between the parties 
that Hanson framed in its motion. Because of the arguments in plaintiffs' opposition 
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memorandum, Hanson's reply memorandum addressed the issue of foreseeability in the 
context of whether Hanson owed a legal duty of care. (R. at 1155-61). 
At oral argument, plaintiffs abandoned their alternative argument that the issue of 
duty of care was a trial issue. Instead, plaintiffs argued that duty was a pre-trial legal 
issue that the trial court should rule on as a matter of law. (R. at 2078: 48). Specifically, 
plaintiffs' counsel instructed the trial court as follows: "Duty is decided by the Court, as 
a matter of law. I don't think there's an issue here that the jury needs to decide. This is -
ought to be decided by the Judge, by the Court, whether or not there's a duty." (R. at 
2078: 48). 
Based on the parties' briefing - both of which stated that the issue of duty should 
be resolved as a matter of law, and the oral argument - in which the trial court was 
instructed that it should rule on the issue of duty as a matter of law, the trial court ruled on 
the issue of duty as a matter of law. (R. at 1182-86). Nothing in either the trial court's 
oral ruling or its written ruling suggested that the trial court did not understand the issue, 
wanted further evidence on the issue, wanted further briefing on the issue, or was 
reserving the issue for trial. (R. at 1182-86; 2078: 38, 53-54). Consistent with Utah law, 
the trial court resolved the issue of duty as a matter of law prior to trial. Finally, plaintiffs 
drafted the written order which unequivocally denied Hanson's motion without any 
further instruction. (R. at 1182-86). 
Notwithstanding Utah law holding that duty is a legal issue, the parties' briefing 
that argued that duty was a legal issue, the parties' oral argument that instructed the trial 
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court to rule as a matter of law, and the trial court's ruling that did not disclose that any 
issues of fact precluded summary judgment, plaintiffs now argue that the trial court's 
ruling may not have addressed the issue as a matter of law and that it could have been 
based on undisclosed and hidden issues of fact that were never disclosed in the record to 
Hanson. (Plaintiffs' brief at pp. 20-22) 
Before the court of appeals, plaintiffs cited to case law and argued that appealing a 
motion for summary judgment after a trial on the merits was akin to planting a bomb at 
the early stages of litigation and then exploding it on appeal. Such an argument would 
suggest that plaintiffs were surprised to learn on appeal that Hanson was contesting 
whether it owed a legal duty of care. At all stages of this case, Hanson has asserted it 
owed no duty of care. 
In contrast, plaintiffs admitted to the trial court that the issue of duty was legal 
issue that could be ruled on before trial. Plaintiffs did not request any jury instructions on 
the issue of establishing that Hanson owed it a duty of care. Rather, the issue of duty was 
resolved before trial as a matter of law. On appeal, plaintiffs now argue that the issue of 
duty is a question of fact that either was presented or should have been presented at trial. 
Plaintiffs, however, instructed the trial court that it should rule on the issue as a matter of 
law - thereby planting the bomb, and then argue on appeal that it was a fact issue for trial 
- exploding it on appeal. Accordingly, it is plaintiffs rather than Hanson who looked to 
plant a bomb in the early stages of the litigation which coulb be exploded on appeal. 
Given the facts and circumstances of this case, Hanson did everything that is 
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required under Utah law to preserve an issue for appeal. Hanson raised the issue, and the 
trial court ruled on the issue. See Brookside Mobile Home Park, Ltd. v. Peebles, 2002 UT 
48, ^14, 48 P.3d 968. Under Utah law, the question of duty is a legal issue for the trial 
court alone to decide. See Webb, 2005 UT 80 at f9; Rose v. Provo City, 2003 UT App 77, 
[^8, 67 P.3d 1017. Accordingly, Hanson preserved the issue for appeal. 
Moreover, assuming that whether Hanson owed a duty of care was solely based on 
foreseeability, the issue is still a legal issue. Plaintiffs attempt to transform whether a 
duty of care is owed into a factual issue by repeated references to the whether or not it 
was foreseeable to Hanson that a tow truck driver would not do his job correctly. 
Plaintiffs also argue that Hanson never argued that foreseeability was an issue of law. 
Again, this argument is belied by the record. At all times in this case, Hanson has argued 
that duty was a legal issue. Although whether or not a duty is owed is based on several 
factors, including foreseeability, the issue of duty is ultimately a legal issue and 
accordingly resolution of the factors that relate to duty is also a legal issue. In other 
words, the fact that foreseeability may be factual in nature does not transform the issue of 
whether a duty of care is owed into a factual issue. Furthermore, which of the factors is 
most important to the duty analysis in a particular case does change whether it is a legal 
or factual issue. If issues of fact concerned the trial court or prevented a ruling on the 
issue, Hanson was entitled to be made aware of that fact. The record does not disclose 
that any issues of fact concerned the trial court in its ruling on Hanson's motion on the 
issue of duty. Rather, the trial court understood the issue, found that Hanson owed a duty 
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of care, and created a dangerous situation. 
In certain instances, it is conceivable that a trial court may reserve its ruling on the 
issue or require resolution of certain factual issues necessary to rule on the issue of duty; 
however, a party is entitled to be aware of what those factual issues are so that it is not 
blind-sided on appeal. If issues of fact precluded summary judgment, the trial court did 
not make any of the parties aware of that fact. If the issue of duty was presented at trial, 
neither of the parties nor the jury was aware of that fact. Moreover, it would be 
inconsistent with Utah law for the jury to decide the issue of duty. 
Notwithstanding all of plaintiffs' arguments that issues of fact could have 
precluded summary judgment and that related issues were presented to the jury, this case 
presents a relatively straightforward appeal of a pre-trial legal issue that the trial court 
resolved on the merits. The court of appeals erred when it concluded that it did not have 
jurisdiction to review the denial of Hanson's motion for summary judgment on the issue 
of whether a duty of care was owed. This Court should reverse the court of appeals' 
conclusion that it lacked jurisdiction to review Hanson's pre-trial motion for summary 
judgment. 
IV. The law of the case doctrine allows trial court, not the parties, discretion to 
revisit issues. 
After a trial court resolves an issue on the merits, a party does not need to re-raise 
the issue in order to preserve appellate review. Hanson followed Utah law in presenting 
the issue of duty to the trial court and preserving the issue for appellate review. Plaintiffs 
are now attempting to change the rules to require future litigants to wonder how many 
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times an issue needs to be raised and re-raised in order to preserve the issue for appellate 
review. 
Plaintiffs' argument that Hanson could have and should have raised the issue of 
duty at trial or in a post-trial motion in order to preserve the issue for appeal is contrary to 
Utah law. Plaintiffs' argument on this point implicates the law of the case doctrine. As 
this Court recently had the occasion to discuss: "under the law of the case doctrine, 'a 
decision made on an issue during one stage of a case is binding in successive stages of the 
same litigation.'" IHCHealth Services, Inc. v. D&KManagement, Inc., 2008 UT 36 at 
T[26. Importantly, this Court noted: "the doctrine allows a court to decline to revisit issues 
within the same case once the court has ruled on them. In this way, the law of the case 
doctrine acts much like the doctrine of res judicata - furthering the goals of judicial 
economy and finality - but within a single case." Id. This Court set forth how the law of 
the case doctrine works procedurally in the trial court: "While a case remains pending 
before the district court prior to any appeal, the parties are bound by the court's prior 
decision, but the court remains free to reconsider that decision. It may do so sua sponte or 
at the suggestion of one of the parties. And this discretionary power of reconsideration 
includes the right of the district court to decline to reopen a matter it has already decided." 
Id.2X%Ll. 
Assuming that the trial court erred in denying Hanson's motion for summary 
judgment, plaintiffs' argue that nothing prevented Hanson from re-raising the issue at trial 
and in a motion at trial. Technically, nothing ever prevents Hanson or any other party 
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from raising, re-raising, and re-raising again and again while the case is pending before 
the trial court. This Court has clearly articulated, however, that a party needs to only raise 
an issue one time in order to preserve it for appeal. See Brookside Mobile Home Park, 
Ltd. v. Peebles, 2002 UT 48, If 14, 48 P.3d 968 ("once trial counsel has raised an issue 
before the trial court, and the trial court has considered the issue, the issue is preserved 
for appeal."). Furthermore, this Court has articulated that a motion to reconsider is no 
longer allowed. See Gillett v. Price, 2006 UT 24 , \1 , 135 P.3d 861. Finally, under the 
law of the case doctrine, the trial court alone has discretion to reopen an issue that is has 
already decided. Hanson was powerless to reopen the issue after the trial court had ruled 
on it, but plaintiffs' advocate that Hanson was required to repeatedly spit into the wind if 
it wanted to preserve an argument for appeal. 
Nevertheless, plaintiffs argue that a party should re-raise an issue that has already 
been ruled on in order to preserve it for appeal. Furthermore, plaintiffs argue that a party 
should do this despite the fact that none of the issues presented at trial implicate the trial 
court's prior ruling. Plaintiffs argue it is incumbent on Hanson to divine that the trial 
court wanted to revisit the issue of duty at trial despite the fact that nothing in the record 
would suggest to Hanson that the trial court was interested in reopening its prior ruling. 
Plaintiffs' argument runs afoul of the law of the case doctrine and this Court's 
prior rule in Brooks ide. Under plaintiffs' argument, parties will have to guess at what is 
sufficient to preserve an issue for appeal. Judicial economy will not served by requiring 
the parties to re-raise issues that the trial court has already addressed. Based on Utah law 
15 
that provides that whether a duty of care is a threshold legal determination, this court 
should decline to require parties to re-raise an issue at trial in order to preserve it for 
appeal. Such a rule would only further tax judicial resources and creates confusion as to 
when an issue is adequately preserved for appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Rather than limiting the scope of appellate review and creating unnecessary 
confusion as to what is enough to preserve an issue for appeal, Hanson requests this Court 
to reverse the court of appeals' decision and to remand for consideration of the merits of 
Hanson's pre-trial motion. 
DATED this . ^ day of July, 2008. 
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ttorneys for Defendant Hanson Equipment, Inc. 
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